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Abstract. Most current self-sovereign identity systems may be categorized as strictly objective,                       
consisting of cryptographically signed statements issued by trusted third party attestors. This                       
failure to provide an input for subjectivity accounts for a central challenge: the inability to address                               
the question of "Who verifies the verifier?". Instead, these protocols outsource their legitimacy to                           
mechanisms beyond their internal structure, relying on traditional centralized institutions such as                       
national ID issuers and KYC providers to verify the claims they hold. This reliance has been                               
employed to safeguard applications from a vulnerability previously thought to be impossible to                         
address in distributed systems: the Sybil attack problem, which describes the abuse of an online                             
system by creating many illegitimate virtual personas. Inspired by the progress in cryptocurrencies                         
and blockchain technology, there has recently been a surge in networked protocols that make use                             
of subjective inputs such as voting, vouching, and interpreting, to arrive at a decentralized and                             
sybil-resistant consensus for identity. In this article, we will outline the approaches of these new                             
and natively digital sources of authentication - their attributes, methodologies strengths, and                       
weaknesses - and sketch out possible directions for future developments. 
 
Introduction 
 
For blockchain networks to move from strictly providing financial services into enabling social and political                             
applications, decentralized protocols for identity must be devised. Lacking reliable means to fingerprint unique                           
human identities, most current blockchain governance practices employ Proof of Stake voting: stakeholders                         
validate their membership through their ownership of a given cryptocurrency (or mining hardware in the case                               
of Proof of Work). These resource-based membership systems have rendered most crypto-governance practices                         
into plutocracies, with a few powerful players able to control choices according to their own interests (​Wright,                                 
2017​; ​De Filippi, 2019​). Clearly, this is antithetical to democratic principles. If blockchains are to become a                                 
significant public infrastructure, particularly in the space of civic engagement, then Proof of Work's                           
“​one-CPU-one-vote​” or Proof of Stake's “​one-dollar-one-vote​” systems will not suffice: in order to enable                           
democratic governance, protocols that signal unique human identities to enable ​"one-person-one-vote" systems                       
must be created. 
1 Microsoft Research 
2 Perm State University 
3 Democracy Earth Foundation 
4 Re-State Foundation, Democracy Earth Foundation 
 
At the center of this question of identity is the Sybil-attack problem. Previously thought to be impossible to                                   
address in distributed systems, sybil attacks describe the abuse of an online system by creating many illegitimate                                 
virtual personas (​Swathi et. al, 2019​; ​Ford, 2012​; ​Doceour, 2002​). However, there has recently been a surge in                                   
networked protocols that make use of subjective inputs such as voting, vouching, and interpreting, to arrive at a                                   
decentralized and sybil-resistant consensus for identity. Driven by the goal of creating a digital layer for                               
humanity, with on-chain and off-chain governance structures (​De Filippi, 2019​), where peers are able to vote,                               
organize and transact freely, recent projects have been contributing significant learnings to the domain. There                             
has not been, as of yet, a cohesive review of these learnings, and of the projects currently being built to solve for                                           
this type of consensus protocol. The present article aims to address this lacuna, and provides an overview of the                                     
underlying theoretical approaches, as well as the leading implementations in this space. The below information                             
is compiled through a combination of secondary research and first-person interviews with the founders of these                               
projects, many of which have not yet been studied by the academy. We note that, while the presented protocols                                     
are by no means an exhaustive summary of all existing implementations, they do provide a diverse and relevant                                   
base from which to understand the state of current work, and to identify relevant tradeoffs and gaps in the                                     
space.  
 
Previous Approaches to Identity Verification 
 
First, we briefly review previous approaches to identity, both decentralized and centralized. In the blockchain                             
space, this begins with Bitcoin's Sybil-protection mechanism, coined Proof of Work. Its description in the                             
original Bitcoin whitepaper as a “​one-CPU-one-vote​” system (​Nakamoto, 2008​) shaped the blockchain industry                         
to think of governance as centered around machine attributes, rather than centered around subjective,                           
human-centered inputs. Proof of Work employs a resource-based membership model by proposing a challenge                           
to nodes that requires computational work. The CPU that solves this challenge first obtains the right to add the                                     
next block of transactions to the chain, and also wins a reward in Bitcoin. If the other CPUs computationally                                     
agree with the validity of the event, they add that block to their own chains and turn towards solving the                                       
challenge for the next block. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest                                   
computational resources effort invested in it. 
 
Similarly, with Proof of Stake ​—​the main Sybil-protection alternative to Proof of Work​— the lack of a robust                                   
notion of personhood has led to the development of plutocracies (​Wright, 2017​; ​De Filippi, 2019​; ​De Filippi                               
et. al​, 2020​): voting power is always relative to stake ownership (clearly so in the Proof of Stake case, and the                                         
problem remains even if stake consists of Proof of Work mining rigs). This results in a fat-tailed distribution of                                     
voting power in those systems, which reflects the Pareto distribution of wealth in society and financial markets                                 
(​Klass et al., 2006​; ​Benhabib et al., 2012​).  
 
The relevance of formalizing identities through natively digital proofs can also be inferred from centralized                             
networks: major Internet platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google established themselves partially by                           
achieving a sufficient level of consensus over their identity credentials, thus creating a trust layer on top of                                   
which a myriad of social applications could be built. This has in turn facilitated the emergence and spread of                                     
multiple borderless political and social movements, as demonstrated by the role of social media in both national                                 
and international politics over the past few years (​Tufekci, 2017​; ​Bruns et. al, 2015​; ​Bennet, 2013​). The only                                   
former alternative able to reach such widespread use pertained to nation-states: our passports and national ID                               
cards. The creation of a global identification system outside of the strict control of nation-states has accelerated                                 
communication and knowledge creation, forming a networked social infrastructure that has allowed for a new                             
kind of participative politics.  
 
However, there are major vulnerabilities with this system, most pertinently i) privacy concerns and data misuse,                               
and ii) the risk of creating exclusions to the system, with significant adverse social and political effects. The                                   
underlying architecture and ownership structure of these current centralized protocols exposes society to                         
surveillance, political manipulation, and data theft; this is particularly relevant in our current global                           
environment, marked by receding democratic freedoms and rising digital authoritarianism ​(​Freedom House                       
2020​; ​Freedom House 2018​). It is also important to note that officially-recognized forms of ID are problematic                                 
for an estimated 1.1 billion people around the globe (​Desai et al., 2017​). Therefore, there is a need to create a                                         
protocol for identity consensus that can operate outside of centralized structures, whether they be nation-states                             
or centralized and privately-owned platforms, while enabling the governance of blockchain networks to prevent                           
the concentration of power and influence present in current Proof of Stake or Proof of Work systems. The                                   
efforts concerning the creation of a distributed and human-centered protocol coalesce into a third                           
denomination:  Proof of Personhood (​Borge et al., 2017​). 
 
Proof of Personhood Protocols 
 
Research in the Proof of Personhood (henceforth PoP) ecosystem aims to extend and improve upon Proof of                                 
Work and Proof of Stake approaches, by focusing on methods capable of creating an analogous decentralized                               
protocol to enable one-person-one-vote systems over blockchain networks. In order to lead to a sybil-resistant                             
consensus for human identification, such a system needs to ensure that every identity within their domain is (i)                                   
unique​, so that no two people should have the same identifier, and (ii) ​singular​, so that one person should not                                       
be able to obtain more than one identifier (​De Filippi et. al, 2019​). The different protocols reviewed here aim to                                       
achieve sybil resistance while also maintaining self-sovereignty (anybody can create and control an identity                           
without the involvement of a centralized 3rd party) and being privacy-preserving (one can acquire and utilize an                                 
identifier without revealing personally identifying information in the process). Those three requirements, sybil                         
resistance, self-sovereignty and privacy-preservation, compose the "Decentralized Identity Trilemma" (​Maciek,                   
2018​). Proof of Personhood approaches aim to achieve those three requirements (to different degrees) by                             
establishing the following: 
 
● Subjective substrate​: some form of "human entropy" that can act as a substitute for the                             
computational work employed by the Proof of Work protocol, or the financial stake employed                           
by the Proof of Stake protocol. This substrate can be expressed in the form of voting,                               
interpreting, being present in a specific place (physical space or cyberspace) and time or                           
interacting with others. Typically, the kind of substrate provided needs to be easy for humans                             
to produce, but difficult for Artificial Intelligence to replicate, thus placating the ability of                           
computer-generated false identities to take over the protocol. Additionally, this substrate needs                       
to be relatively easy for humans to produce once, but relatively difficult for humans to                             
produce two times or more, thus placating the ability of human-generated false identities to                           
take over the protocol. A salient feature of these substrates is that they will typically involve                               
minimal to zero personally identifiable information, thus preserving the privacy of                     
authenticated individuals.  
 
● Objective incentive: An incentive for nodes to join the network and continuously maintain its                           
legitimacy. Ideally, this incentive needs to be strong enough to ensure that it is more valuable                               
to be a part of the network as a legitimate entity, than selling one's membership as a                                 
Mechanical Turk. With the exception of Upala, all of the protocols described in this report                             
employ or aim to employ some form of Universal Basic Income in cryptocurrency, associated                           
with the protocol and distributed equitably to all members. This incentive can serve as a way                               
to employ behavioral economics, where one loses currency through misbehavior (by somehow                       
attacking the legitimacy of the protocol), or earns more by behaving in ways that make the                               
protocol stronger. ​Adittionally, there may be other incentives, such as the desire for partial                           
privacy or full anonymity in online spaces and transactions.   
 
We further outline the following desired primary properties of the Proof of Personhood protocols, consolidated                             
from the literature, that allow for comparison: 
 
● Decentralization​. Decentralization is a multifaceted measure, analyzing how many independent parties                     
have effective control over various components of the distributed system (​Srinivasan, 2017​). In the case                             
of PoP, the components of interest are the identity registry, graph of connections and vouching links,                               
software code and releases, operation systems, blockchains and hardware, etc. Decentralization                     
minimizes trust by eliminating third parties, and maximizes collusion resistance. Sybil-resistant identity                       
systems must have controls or incentives that would prevent control by bad actors, either through                             
collusion or through purchasing verified identities en masse. It is particularly important to identify who                             
has permissions to write to the registry of identities: is the registry permissionless or is it permissioned                                 
and controlled by an organization or a consortium? If the latter is the case, the protocol is not                                   
decentralized as the trust on a registry manager is going to be required, even if the identity information                                   
is stored on a decentralized ledger. 
 
● Privacy preservation​. We analyze levels of privacy preservation through measures of anonymity,                       
pseudonymity, unlinkability, unobservability, and plausible deniability (​Beckers, 2012​). A brief                   
outline: Anonymity means that individuals are not identifiable. Pseudonymity denotes the usage of an                           
identifier rather than a real name. Unlinkability refers to the fact that attackers cannot determine                             
linkages between items such as transactions and addresses. Unobservability implies the anonymity of                         
the persons involved in the transactions. The final aspect is plausible deniability: the ability to                             
convincingly deny the possession of a certain identity and impossibility for authorities to prove the                             
opposite. 
 
● Scalability​. The identity system should have the capacity to onboard and provide service to a significant                               
fraction of the global population. In addition, the system should be socially scalable (​Szabo, 2017​), have                               
sufficient incentives for people to join the network, and have a low barrier to entry, including technical                                 
(private key management, interacting with specialized software, e.g. Metamask), financial (paying                     
blockchain fees, staking value tokens or cryptocurrencies, etc.), physical (offline proof of presence                         
ceremonies, p2p physical vouching meetings, etc.).  
 
A taxonomy of approaches 
 
Before reviewing existing solutions, in this section we will outline the different theoretical primitives that                             
underpin Proof of Personhood approaches. Throughout the past few decades, different approaches have been                           
outlined in order to address one fundamental question: how can we distinguish a human from a machine? We                                   
describe recent approaches below. 
 
Reverse Turing Tests 
 
"Can machines think?" asked Alan Turing at the opening of his 1950 paper, "Computing Machinery and                               
Intelligence". In order to narrow this question down to one with an objective answer, Turing created the                                 
"Imitation Game", in which an evaluator having a conversation with another entity through a text-only channel                               
attempts to determine whether the entity in question is a human or a computer.  
 
Known as the Turing Test, this method created the base for the CAPTCHA, a "Completely Automated Public                                 
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart", widely used to elicit proof from humans that they are not                                     
bots. It does so by requiring humans to parse through distorted words and images; a class of tasks known as                                       
"AI-hard" (​von Ahn et al., 2003​): difficult for an algorithm to perform, simple for a human. However, in                                   
addition to serving the purpose of authenticating humans, the input from a CAPTCHA test is also used to                                   
calibrate the pattern recognition capacities of artificial intelligence algorithms. Thus, machine learning presents                         
an evolving threat to the functioning of these CAPTCHAs. 
 
New approaches are being developed in order to address this challenge. The Idena Network, one of the                                 
solutions presented in this report, has shown that, in order for CAPTCHAs to resist the dynamic development                                 
of AI connected with neural networks and deep learning, they must not be generated algorithmically, but                               
instead created by humans (​Idena Network, 2019​). Only then will those tests not belong to the class of                                   
“recognition” tasks, solvable by neural networks, and instead truly belong to the class of AI-hard problems,                               
requiring an understanding of implied meaning, or the use of common-sense reasoning.  
 
Recent AI-hard tests extend principles from the Winograd Schema Challenge (WSC), which would pose                           
implied-meaning questions like the one below: 
 
"The trophy would not fit in the brown suitcase because it was too big. What was too big?" 
1. The trophy 
2. The suitcase" 
 
However, due to its reliance on textual representation, WSCs may be vulnerable to new advances in natural                                 
language processing such as GPT-3 (the accuracy of the state-of-the-art models in WinoGrande challenge                          5
5 AI2 WinoGrande Challenge leaderboard, ​https://leaderboard.allenai.org/winogrande/submissions/public  
currently reaches 0.7-0.85 AUC compared to 0.94 AUC human performance). Additionally, this approach                         
requires specific language knowledge, and therefore fails to create a standard that can be applied internationally.                               
Thus, the use of images is more likely to remain robust in the long term. 
   
The Idena Network builds on these previous approaches by creating an                     
AI-hard test that both requires common-sense reasoning, and is based on visual                       
representation. Named FLIP, it asks users to choose between two orderings of                       
images, with only one set conveying a logical and meaningful story. Human                       
accuracy in solving FLIPs is at 95% , while AI teams have not yet even reached                             6
71-80%.  7
 
Alternative AI-hard reverse Turing Tests are VCR (Visual Commonsense                 
Reasoning) , ROPES (Reasoning Over Paragraph Effects in Situations) ,               8 9
ALFRED (Action Learning From Realistic Environments and Directives)               10
and others, although at the moment these are not being employed by any Proof                           
of Personhood solution.  
 
One important thing to note is that while reverse Turing tests may prevent                         
automated and bot attacks, they fail to address human-generated attacks, in                     
which one individual passes the test multiple times and creates multiple                     
different identities. To address this second aspect of the challenge approaches                     
such as the FLIP created by the Idena Network, or ATUCAPTS (​Conitzer et                         
al., 2016​) employ elements of a Pseudonymous Party, as described below.  
 
Pseudonymous Parties 
 
Pseudonymous parties are an effective mechanism to avoid a tradeoff between accountability and anonymity in                             
digital domains. This is a "back to basics" approach that builds upon a simple security foundation: real humans                                   
can only be in one place at a time (​Ford, 2008​). In this method, authentication comes from being physically                                     
present at a specific place and time. In this physical space, attendees will formalize procedures to register that                                   
presence, such as individuals scanning each other's QR codes, and by that act generating an anonymous                               
credential or token (​Borge et al., 2017​). These credentials can then be utilized to establish membership in online                                   
communities. In essence, pseudonymous parties act as a framework for individuals to conduct reverse Turing                             
Tests on each other. For as long as hyper-realistic digital forgeries remain in the Uncanny Valley (​Mori, 1970​),                                   
virtual pseudonymous parties may be feasible. This is especially true if utilized in combination with AI-hard                               
tests, which require human interpretation. These approaches combine reverse Turing tests with pseudonymous                         
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parties: users willing to be authenticated need to perform the test simultaneously, and, because two humans                               
cannot perform the same action at the same time, the protocol ensures the singularity of authentication. 
 
Pseudonymous parties provide significant accountability since membership rights are limited and can be                         
revoked, while preserving a relatively high degree of anonymity, since credentials do not need to contain any                                 
personal identifying information. Furthermore, this system ensures that no individual is able to acquire more                             
than one identity within a domain.  
 
However, the requirement for significant engagement for authentication is a clear downside, particularly since                           
credentials are not permanent: all "nodes" must be synchronized at a certain frequency, so that new individuals                                 
may join the protocol. There are also concerns regarding the authentication of users in remote or faraway                                 
locations, who may not be able to attend physical gatherings. This friction may be minimized by leveraging                                 
existing gatherings such as conferences, rituals and civic ceremonies for identity authentication (​Ford, 2020​), as                             
well as through virtual pseudonymous parties. 
 
Web of Trust 
 
A Web of Trust consists of identity certificates that can be digitally signed by other users who, by that act,                                       
declare the certificate valid, and thus provide Proof of Personhood. Through this process, the nodes of the                                 
network are effectively partitioned into Sybils and non-Sybils (​Viswanath et al., 2010)​. The Web of Trust                               
paradigm relies on the fact that, while an attacker may be able to arbitrarily create Sybil identities in social                                     
networks, it will be much harder to substantiate said identities with an arbitrarily large number of false                                 
connections to trusted nodes (​Viswanath et al., 2012​). Sybil nodes will thus be poorly connected to the trusted                                   
network, and easily identified. Web of trust schemes may be further reinforced by a reputation system that                                 
serves to track trust levels and prevent deception (​Dunphy et. al, 2018​).  
 
We note that there have been attempts to create a web of trust framework through automated graph analysis of                                     
existing social trust networks, particularly social media networks. One such approach is SybilRank, which aims                             
to identify fake accounts within bounded social media networks, and has met with some success (​Cao et al.,                                   
2012​). However, it is unlikely that widely-used online social networks are good candidates for large-scale                             
identity approaches, particularly for sensitive applications like civic engagement. This is due not only to the ease                                 
with which attackers can create ‘false’ nodes with real relationships and connections to other nodes (​Ford, 2020​;                                 
Ferrara et al., 2016​), but also because re-orienting an identity program around privately-owned, centralized                           
social network platforms is antithetical to the project of self-sovereign identity solutions.  
 
Despite the long-term interest in Web of Trust, with the first, limited-scope version set out in the second PGP                                     
manual in 1992, several inherent issues with the approach have prevented large-scale adoption. First, a                             
combination of different claims and credentials may not entirely guarantee sybil-resistance (​Wang et al., 2020​).                             
Further, levels of trust cannot be easily quantified, and only first degree relationships can be fully trusted, which                                   
can constrain the network. Similar to pseudonymous parties, these issues can also prevent users from                             
low-infrastructure or remote locations from acquiring key signs, or building in-network credibility (​Wilson et                           
al., 2015​). To correct for these issues, the web of trust paradigm has been adapted, extended, and paired with                                     
other approaches, notably in the form of mutual surety graphs, as well as graphs with other topological features                                   
(​Shahaf et al., 2019​). Two of the implementations we will discuss also aim to extend the subjectivities of the web                                       
of trust approach, moving towards a more intersectional paradigm, as described below (​Immorlica et al., 2019​).  
 
Intersectional Identity 
 
Intersectional Identity is a framework that aims to bridge formal verification methodologies to the informal                             
mechanisms through which individuals check the validity of identity-related claims. It builds upon traditional                           
Web of Trust schemes by expanding the scope of markers that can be taken into account, such as one's name,                                       
age, address, gps history, interactions, skills, work, education, etc. All of these different markers can be translated                                 
into bits, so any given individual is associated with an exponentially large number of potential bits that may be                                     
useful for authentication.  
 
This framework achieves uniqueness, or Sybil-resistance, by drawing from three aspects of identity highlighted                           
in the classical sociology of Georg Simmel: sociality, intersectionality and redundancy (​Simmel, 1908​). Here,                           
sociality refers to the fact that every aspect of identity is shared. Intersectionality implies that the set of others                                     
with whom the identity markers of any given individual are shared differs for each marker, thus no individual or                                     
group can serve as a central 'chokepoint' for identity verification. Redundancy denotes that the uniqueness of                               
an individual is over-determined by the countless unique intersections of groups or sources of trust that each                                 
person finds themselves in through the course of their lives. With data architectures put in place to record                                   
intersectional markers, Sybil-resistant identities can be established by tracking just a few characteristics that                           
uniquely identify an individual, while keeping sensitive information private (​Immorlica et al., 2019​). 
 
Token Curated Registry 
 
The Token Curated Registry (TCR) in contrast to the schemes outlined above, was not originally devised as a                                   
method for identity verification. In essence, TCRs draw from behavioural economics to replace list owners,                             
instead aiming to create economic incentives for decentralized list curation. Members of a list hold tokens                               
associated with the list, which may increase in value if they are able to maintain its quality, legitimacy or                                     
popularity, thus attracting more list applicants who want to add their data to it (​Asgaonkar et al., 2018​).                                   
Members can establish trust through different mechanisms, such as staking a certain amount of funds, voting or                                 
vouching for each other. TCRs have successfully been applied towards curating professionals, content, and                           
services, and are particularly instrumental in enabling decentralized courts for blockchain-based dispute                       
resolution frameworks (​Lesaege et al., 2019​). Building upon these successes, different identity solutions are                           
employing this mechanism to create an incentive for members of an identity registry to go through the effort of                                     
verifying each other's uniqueness and singularity. 
 
Existing Efforts 
 
We now outline the approaches of these new and natively digital sources of authentication - their attributes,                                 
methodologies, strengths, and weaknesses - and sketch out possible directions for future developments. 
 
 
 
Idena Network 
 
Idena, an open source project created by an anonymous group of engineers and computer scientists, operates via                                 
reverse Turing-test ceremonies (​Idena Network, 2019​). It has created its own blockchain, which is driven by a                                 
proof-of-person consensus, with every node linked to a cryptoidentity with equal voting power. The Idena                             
Network implements a novel way of achieving Sybil resilience by combining machine learning-resistant reverse                           
Turing tests with virtual pseudonymous parties. This is done through the implementation of a live event held                                 
over its entire network — currently conducted around once a week — during which participants are required to                                   
simultaneously solve FLIPS. Given that the tests cannot be solved by existing AI, Idena successfully provides a                                 
proof of personhood. However, it is not strictly anti-Sybil, with a probabilistic margin of error: although highly                                 
unlikely, a person with exceptional ability could solve multiple FLIPS within their allotted time, thus earning                               
more valid identities within the network. However, Idena demonstrates that "liveness" — a synchronous event                             
— can play a critical role in Sybil prevention: the time constraint prevents a single entity from solving more than                                       
a few sets of FLIPs.  
 
As an additional layer of security, Idena requires new members to present an invite code in order to join their                                       
first authentication ceremony. This code can only be obtained through existing members, thereby creating a                             
Web of Trust. This also extends into a reward-based system: at every validation ceremony, Idena rewards all of                                   
it's members with its DNA cryptocurrency; by inviting members who consistently attend validation ceremonies                           
one may gain compounded rewards. Thus, in order to maximally use theri invitation codes, existing members                               
are incentivized to be cautious about sharing invitations with strangers, and will typically make sure to interview                                 
them in advance. Such interviews, in effect,  act as reverse Turing Tests.  
 
Launched in August 2019, to date the Idena Network has been able to validate more than 2700 identities .                                   11
Their approach presents a significant advance for the research and development concerned with natively digital                             
identity protocols. Combining reverse Turing Tests with pseudonymous parties involves no data point except                           
that of proof of conscious cognitive ability. The tradeoff is a significantly high coordination cost to achieve                                 
recurrent, simultaneous solving of FLIPS: all nodes must continuously participate in the synchronous events,                           
otherwise their identities expire. This reduces the incentive for nodes to join the network, depending on the                                 
relative value of the rewards paid by the protocol for successful validation and participation in block producing.                                 
Additionally, it remains to be seen whether its Sybil-resistance strategy will be able to resist the dynamic                                 
development of AI connected with neural networks and deep learning. Furthermore, its effectiveness may be                             
hindered by the creation of markets that sell false identities and attacks by mechanical turks. 
 
Humanity DAO 
 
Humanity DAO is an Ethereum protocol. It was designed to incentivize a set of economic actors to maintain a                                     
registry of unique human identities without a central authority (​McAteer, 2019​), and leveraged existing work                             
on Token Curated Registries (​Asgaonker et. al, 2018​). In Humanity DAO's case, holders evaluate candidate                             
11 ​Idena epoch #50 results, ​https://scan.idena.io/epoch/50  
identities and deem them legitimate through consensus-based voting. The protocol consists of the following                           
steps: 
  
1. Applicants made a request to join the  list using their social media profile information.  
 
2. Applicants staked a fee on their candidacy. If the applicant got rejected, the application fee was ceded. 
 
3. Members of the list voted on whether the new applicant should be included based on the submitted                                 
profile. Members were incentivized to curate the list honestly in order to generate demand from new                               
applicants, leading to a long term sustainability of the project. 
 
The registry had a method called ​isHuman that any smart contract could query to see whether a given Ethereum                                     
address had been confirmed as a unique human. Humanity DAO also deployed a Universal Basic Income smart                                 
contract with 2,500 Dai (~$2,500), which early applicants could claim at a rate of 1 Dai per month, until supply                                       
ran out. 
 
Launched in May 2019, the project quickly gained rapid traction, reaching around 640 approved members                             12
and being adopted by many influential figures within the Ethereum Network, however growth stagnated after                             
the initial community of early adopters from the network was saturated (​Wikiel, 2019​). Further, as a fully                                 
decentralized solution, creators had very little ability to change the protocol after it was launched. As related to                                   
us by the founder, this resulted in Humanity DAO suffering various forms of attacks, including one in which a                                     
change to the smart contract made it prohibitively expensive for new applicants to join. These repeated attacks                                 
led to the eventual termination of the project in January 2020.  
 
Kleros  
 
Kleros is an Ethereum-based protocol for decentralized dispute resolution. Their successful experiments with                         
TCRs for distributed courts led the team to propose "Proof of Humanity": a solution for identity based on                                   
TCRs combined with a web of trust based on submitted photos, bios, and video recordings. This information                                 
will be stored using the IPFS (InterPlanetary File System). Kleros’ approach distinguishes itself by appending                             13
to the functioning of its protocol a recourse to adjudicate cases of faulty or duplicate users. This is done through                                       
distributed dispute resolution systems such as the Kleros Court , or if decided by members through the                               14
registry's internal governance, other alternatives such as Aragon's courts .  15
 
Within the Proof of Humanity protocol, users can vouch for other users, but are encouraged to do so only if                                       
they have met the user physically and can thus identify them accurately. To incentivize the maintenance of the                                   
registry, vouching deposits will serve as a bounty, available for anyone able to correctly identify false positives in                                   
the registry. If a member vouches for users that are later determined to be duplicate or false by the distributed                                       
12 Humanity DAO smart contract, 
https://bloxy.info/token_holders/0xbbd1706d16418bb136e1497a73d3af4164586da0 
13 ​As related to the authors by the co-Founder and CTO of Kleros, Clément Lesaege. 
14 Kleros Court, ​https://blog.kleros.io/kleros-court-revitalised/ 
15 Aragon Court, ​https://anj.aragon.org/ 
court, they are punished in the form of being removed from the registry and losing their vouching deposit, thus                                     
discouraging such attacks (​Kleros, 2019​).  
 
While this protocol has significant promise in building an effective reputation-based web of trust with tools in                                 
place to adjudicate cases in which the singularity of an identity is disputed, it compromises biometric                               
information of members by requiring a video selfie and other additional information, which may de-incentivize                             
potential users. 
 
Upala  
 
Upala is an Ethereum-based protocol, designed to be interoperable with DAOs, which provides a digital identity                               
uniqueness score (​Upala, 2019​). This score is represented by a price, for which an identity can be sold at any                                       
time.  
 
Members will have a stake in their DAOs, and they can control this stake with their identity. The combined                                     
stake represents the "price" of the combined identity of the members. Thus, a DAO with X members, in which                                     
each member contributes a stake of Y dollars, will have a total pool of XY dollars, accessible to any member at                                         
any time.  Thus, a breach of trust can result in a loss of both resources and reputation. 
 
In this process, Upala implements the social responsibility concept, in which members are incentivized to invite                               
only highly-trusted other members to join a DAO. Through accumulating trust and increasing access to larger                               
pools over time, users are able to signal their reputation and uniqueness. Conversely, if a member breaks trust                                   
and steals from the combined pool, costs to rejoin the group will increase, providing additional protections to                                 
groups over time.  
 
The primary weakness encoded within the Upala protocol is the disproportionate power that capital can exert                               
within it, with individuals that have access to large amounts of capital able to control different identities, burn                                   
these identities, and re-join the protocol. However, it is possible that this undue influence will decrease, as                                 
groups form and trust consolidates within the system, and the cost of multiple entries increases.  
 
Upala has launched its first working prototype on Kovan testnet of Ethereum in June 2020 .  16
 
BrightID 
 
BrightID operates an intersectional web of trust protocol, built through graphing social connections, with the                             
additional input of trusted seed identities. The purpose of this protocol is to allow for users to provide proof                                     
that they are not using multiple accounts on a single application, and it is thus designed to be interoperable with                                       
Web 2.0. social media platforms. The interconnectivity of its graph is designed to identify true identities and                                 
Sybil identities, based on node position in relation to trusted seeds. 
 
16 ​https://twitter.com/TheUpala/status/1275340607729266688?s=20  
Thus, BrightID is the solution most in line with the Intersectional Identity paradigm, formalizing social                             
connections in order to allow for a variety of nodes to join the system and customize their own evaluation                                     
criteria. In that sense, there are no obvious limits to the number of trusted seeds in the BrightID graph: any                                       
application utilizing their authentication solution may establish its own BrightID node with different trusted                           
seeds. Each BrightID node runs its own instance of ArangoDB to store the graph of Web of Trust connections.                                     
Every verification can be broadcasted to a specified isolated smart contract on Ethereum or another blockchain.                               
The social graph serves as a common base across all nodes, but the analysis of other graphs can be distinct, so the                                           
protocol does not require consensus across graphs. Applications may either run their nodes in a centralized or                                 
closed manner, sharing their analysis and verification outputs only with themselves, or they can provide a greater                                 
level of decentralization, allowing any user to run the verification and sample the output from a large number of                                     
nodes. ​To control for Sybil attacks BrightID runs GroupSybilRank, a modification of the SybilRank algorithm,                             
to estimate the anti-Sybil score of the network participants based on affinity between groups. This algorithm has                                 
achieved best results based on modeled attacks and is proposed to be used as the official BrightID anti-sybil                                   
algorithm . 17
 
BrightID's open Web of Trust architecture is robust and promising. That said, at this early stage BrightID's                                 
social experiment has significant challenges to overcome in terms of Sybil-resistance, decentralization,                       
self-sovereignty and privacy. As of July 2020, its solution is limited to a small seed network, so there are no                                       
established paths for individuals or groups who are completely independent from the existing network to                             
self-authenticate - thus it is not yet a fully self sovereign solution. This is not an intractable limitation, as new                                       
nodes can potentially define new verification methods that would allow for islands of users to be verified.                                 
However, scaling this process is far from trivial. One possible solution is through establishing partnerships with                               
existing social media platforms that reach a wide net of users, but this would largely defeat the aim of the initial                                         
motivators of Proof of Personhood solutions. Therefore, the crucial challenge for the success of this experiment                               
is finding a path forward for scalability while maintaining decentralization. 
 
To this end, BrightID's initial whitepaper encourages the creation of new seeding DAOs (Decentralized                           
Autonomous Organizations) , and establishes that the BrightID Main DAO will promote research of different                           18
seed selection methods, as well as the creation of tools that can make seed selection scalable. In that sense,                                     
BrightID's success may be in tandem with an increase in the adoption of decentralized governance frameworks.                               
Another possible pathway to scale is through BrightID’s weekly pseudonymous parties, during which                         
prospective members can meet the existing community and obtain verification to form new links.  
 
A new IDChain blockchain was recently introduced to implement BrightID DAO governance (​Stallard, 2020​).                           
IDChain is a fork of the geth Ethereum node software, at which BrightID participants can self register via a                                     
web-service to receive a lifetime supply of Eidi (the native gas token on IDChain). Hedge for Humanity, a U.S.                                     
19
based, tax deductible 501(c)(3) charitable organization, plans to start distributing $1 US dollar / month to each                                 
of the BrightID’s users as a Universal Basic Income , as a way to incentivize attacks that can provide greater                                     20
17 ​BrightID Anti-Sybil, ​https://github.com/BrightID/BrightID-AntiSybil  
18 ​Bright ID's whitepaper, pages 9-10, ​https://www.brightid.org/whitepaper 
19 ​IDChain onboarding service, ​https://idchain.one/begin/  
20  Hedge for Humanity DOLLAR4EVERYONE, ​https://www.hedgeforhumanity.org/  
visibility into the vulnerabilities of the identity system. Currently BrightID has 489 users with a positive                               
anti-Sybil rank . 21
 
Duniter  
 
The Duniter project, originally named uCoin, was started in June 2013 . The project is based on the work of                                     22
the relative theory of money (RTM), developed by Stéphane Laborde “Ğaluel” (​Laborde, 2017​). Duniter is an                               
independent blockchain utilized to mint the Ğ1 cryptocurrency as a Universal Dividend available to unique                             
human participants. Authentication within the Duniter protocol is done through a Web of Trust type of                               
scheme, which is anchored in either offline or remote encounters. 
 
In order to join the protocol, one must receive five different vouches from existing members. Duniter members                                 
have an informal agreement to vouch solely for new applicants who they have met in the physical world, or                                     
know enough to be able to contact remotely through different channels, such as social network, forums, email,                                 
video conferences, or phone calls. For each new member, a PGP key pair is created. Furthermore, any                                 23
newcomer must be at a maximum distance of 5 different connections from the central, highly trusted seed                                 
identities (​Duniter, 2018)​. These requirements create a strong offline foundation for Duniter, which is seeing a                               
slow but steady growth in France and nearby countries. As of June 2020, Duniter had 3761 members .  24
 
The Intersubjective Consensus 
 
The Intersubjective Consensus approach creates a meta protocol against which other identity protocols can                           
measure their legitimacy (​DemocracyEarth, 2020​). It is designed to create an intersubjective space able to                             
account for measurements of both collective intentionalities and objective facts by combining a subjective                           
function that provides legitimacy to the score based on Quadratic Voting, and an objective function that                               
measures the Gini Coefficient of any DAO existing on the Ethereum blockchain. It will create a Democratic                                 
Index, as shown in the figures below, and assign a score to every Ethereum address relative to the intersection of                                       
DAOs in which it belongs as a member, or its position in the social graph of blockchain-based transactions. 
 
 
21 ​Officially hosted BrightID graph (retrieved: 23 Jul 2020), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/brightid-backups/brightid.json  
22 ​Duniter P2PF Wiki page, ​https://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Duniter  
23 ​Duniter License, ​https://duniter.org/en/wiki/g1-license/ 
24 ​Duniter Forum, ​https://forum.duniter.org/t/nombre-didentites-dexclusions-de-revocations-etc/7428  
 
Fig. 2. Every address that belongs to a DAO will be weighted by the Intersubjective Consensus protocol with a                                     
percentage of the Democratic Index obtained from the intersection of DAOs that constitute the identity of such                                 
address. 
 
Fig. 3. In order to counterweight false positives on the Gini Coefficient, addresses that achieve a high score will be                                       
granted the right to rank the different DAOs analyzed by the Intersubjective Consensus oracle, according the                               
their corresponding ability to ensure that no single Human controls more than one identifier within its domain. 
 
Fig. 4. The Gini coefficient for democracy ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing perfect totalitarianism and 1                                     
representing perfect democracy. It computes a score that measures the share distribution by each segment of                               
addresses belonging to a DAO. 
 
Fig. 5. A Democratic Index is calculated for each DAO, as a function of their position in the Quadratic Voting                                       
rank and their Gini Coefficient. 
 
The current interface provides a basic personhood calculation for each DAO member (​DemocracyEarth, 2020​)                           
of v1 Moloch DAOs , with 472 addresses receiving a "definitely human"score . ​Examples of DAO contracts                               25
with parameters applicable as inputs for a PASS oracle include MolochDAO, DAOstack, Kleros and Aragon                             
DAOs. Additional sources of trust can be included by allowing token swaps with other non-EVM protocols                               
such as the Idena Network.  
 
Discussion 
 
The seven reviewed projects in the digital identity space have made hitherto unimaginable progress in creating                               
robust, repeatable paradigms to construct a PoP solution. They approach the problem in a diversity of ways,                                 
and use a variety of different substrates in order to successfully authenticate human users: reverse Turing Tests                                 
(Idena Network), social graph data emerging from a Web of Trust type of scheme (Duniter, BrightID,                               
Humanity DAO and Kleros), and probabilistic approaches that combine an analysis of objective financial value                             
and its distribution within different domains, with some other form of human entropy that can be detected                                 
online (Intersubjective Consensus and Upala).  
 
Despite clear shortcomings, these creative uses of subjectivity can point towards interesting, hybrid approaches                           
to verifying Proof of Personhood in the current ecosystem. In fact, the distinction between different approaches                               
for Sybil-protection may be overdrawn: most of the solutions outlined in this review employ a combination of                                 
them in order to secure their networks. In some cases this combination of tactics is formalized, such as with                                     
Idena Network - predicated on reverse Turing tests, but accessible through their invite code system, an instance                                 
of a Web of Trust approach. In other cases additional protocols are appended tangentially and informally, such                                 
as with BrightID's employment of weekly Pseudonymous Parties to welcome new members. In this sense, the                               
theoretical primitives have almost false separations: when it comes to implementation, they truly co-occur and                             
build on one another, rather than being contained by the distinctions we see explicated in the academy.   
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Table 1:  Approach Characteristics and Comparisons
Approach Governance Size Blockchain Protocol Substrate Decentralization Privacy Scalability
Idena Network
Public
network
2700 Idena
Synchronous
reverse
Turing-test
ceremonies
FLIPS
Decentralized identity registry
management. Every participant
can run a full validator/mining
node. Change of the protocol
requires network consensus
No personally identifying
information (PII) sharing
required. Node IP address
observable
Node install, getting invite code and regular
participation in the  ip ceremonies required.
Participation  incentivized with mining and
ceremony rewards (~$1.7/day)
Humanity DAO DAO 640 Ethereum
Web of Trust +
Token Curated
Registry
Social media
pro le
information
P2P vouching.
Decentralized identity registry
management
Social media account
(Twitter) sharing required.
Ethereum address observable
Web3 dapp interaction, paying Ethereum
fees and identity stake required. Participation
incentivized with a UBI (1 Dai/month)
Kleros
DAO + Legal
entity
N/A Ethereum
Web of Trust +
Token Curated
Registry
Personal
information,
photos, and
video sel es
P2P vouching.
Decentralized identity registry
management
Video sel e sharing required.
Ethereum address observable
Web3 dapp interaction, paying Ethereum
fees and identity stake required. Participation
incentivized indirectly with court rewards
Upala Individual N/A Ethereum
Probabilistic
Price of
Personhood
Identity-
controlled proof
of stake
Decentralized identity registry
management
No additional PII sharing
required. Ethereum address
observable
Web3 dapp interaction, paying Ethereum
fees and identity stake required
BrightID DAO 489
Ethereum/
IDChain
Intersectional
Web of Trust
Existing social
connections +
weekly online
meetups
P2P vouching.
Semi-decentralized identity
registry management
No PII sharing required.
Social graph and IDChain
address observable
Mobile app vouching required. Participation
incentivized with IDChain native token
airdrop that can be used to pay fees
Duniter
Public
network
3761 Duniter Web of Trust
Contact
information +
o ine meeting
P2P vouching.
Decentralized identity registry
management
No PII sharing required.
Social graph observable
Vouching meeting with 5 members required.
Participation incentivized with Universal
Dividends in Ğ1 cryptocurrency
Intersubjective
Consensus
DAO 472 Ethereum
Meta Protocol:
Democracy Index
Participation in
DAOs
Decentralized identity registry
management
No PII sharing required.
Ethereum address observable
Web3 dapp interaction and paying Ethereum
fees required
As outlined in Table 1, each project entails significant tradeoffs, with each substrate forming or leading to a                                   
possible weakness in the system. Here, we outline the research gaps evident in each protocol, with the hope of                                     
providing a path forward to addressing and solving these issues. We begin with the Idena Network, the only                                   
fully decentralized and privacy preserving solution. Currently, the synchronous reverse Turing test model of the                             
network requires a significant commitment to invest time and effort on the part of its participants to create                                   
FLIPs and participate in regular validation ceremonies, taking place every two weeks or less often depending on                                 
the network size. Its Sybil-resistance strategy is currently effective, but it remains to be seen whether AI-hard                                 
tests will be able to resist the dynamic development of AI connected with neural networks and deep learning.                                   
Furthermore, it is not certain that the current incentives model put in place will be sufficient to placate the                                     
creation of a marketplace for false identities with mechanical turk attacks. 
 
Humanity DAO, while extremely promising, required the ​use of privately-owned identity information from                         
social networks like Twitter to verify identity, again exposing users to the vulnerabilities of Internet monopolies                               
and largely defeating the aim of the initial motivators of such consensus identity proofs. The system also fell                                   
prey to attack due to its necessarily fixed protocol. Kleros requires users submit a range of personal information                                   
and video proof - effectively a biometrics, which is likely to prevent many from using the service, and it remains                                       
to be seen whether their system of reward and punishment will be sufficient to prevent dishonest vouching.                                 
Upala’s social responsibility concept shows promise in preserving trust, but currently allows for capital-rich                           
users ​to re-join multiple times with different identities as long as they can continue to afford it. This could                                     
create significant imbalances, which would be a major ​hindrance to the goal of decentralized, democratized civic                               
engagement.  
 
BrightID is currently the most intersectional solution explored in this paper, and thus may have significant                               
scalability potential. However, its current reliance on establishing trust through connections to a small, trusted                             
seed network makes it difficult for independent groups to self-authenticate. BrightID has a certain degree of                               
centralization, as it relies on privately configured nodes to manage identity registries, selected by BrightID                             
founding team, although there is promising potential for improvement with the introduction of the IDChain                             
and integration of the seed selection and vouching process into IDChain-based DAO. One more possible                             
hindrance to the adoption of BrightID stands in its reliance on a public social graph, which may compromise                                   
the privacy of authenticated users, if the real world identity of some of the participants is revealed. Finally, the                                     
Sybil-resistance of the BrightID’s GroupSybilRank algorithm has yet to be proven.   
 
Duniter’s requirement of at least five offline vouching links, exhibits good Sybil-protection properties, but                           
significantly restricts the network growth, especially outside of the Duniter community geographics. Finally, the                           
Intersubjective Consensus, a protocol to evaluate other protocols, is currently fairly restrictive in its scope, and                               
also does not form a substrate of identity verification in and of itself, instead relying on participation in one of                                       
the other, existing protocols. 
 
As 4 out of the 7 solutions analyzed in this review rely primarily on a Web of Trust, it is important to note that                                               
presently there is no evidence of its effectiveness for Sybil-resistance in the presence of multiple attack vectors.                                 
Bad actors may forge multiple real relationships under different names in different groups: if there are enough                                 
non-intersecting small groups an attacker may be able to grow a significant amount of Sybils over time. The                                   
prevention of such attacks often requires sophisticated data processing and modeling techniques: a notable                           
example is Facebook's periodic take down of, on average, 2 billion fake accounts per quarter using machine                                 
learning algorithms like SybilEdge, which employ behavioral and content classifiers to flag an account as abusive                               
(​Breuer, 2020​). 
 
Thus, we see that there is still significant work to be done. One possible mode of inquiry is to look to PoP                                           
systems that are not directly blockchain-based, but instead use more intersectional approaches. A theoretical                           
approach to such a project was outlined by Nicole Immorlica et. al, proposing a protocol of verifying identity                                   
through proofs of social intersection, extending the Web of Trust approach (​Immorlica et al., 2019​). This                               
system would allow for users to check the claims of others, with varying levels of trust, or credit, assigned to each                                         
user in relation to others; this system of credit could also extend to groups of users, as relevant, to further                                       
prevent false claims. Such a system has been partially implemented by ​Identiq​, which has created a providerless,                                 
peer-to-peer network that allows for companies to collaborate to validate users. However, Identiq is not only                               
itself privately-owned and closed-source, it also puts validation power in the hands of corporations, and thus                               
does not provide a fully decentralized solution, particularly one that could be leveraged for civic engagement                               
purposes. 
 
Protocols that focus directly on social interaction are also relevant here. Consider Nomqa, an upcoming                             
solution that verifies humanity by scoring interactions between users based on subjective meaning. This                           
approach brings in the much-needed subjectivity component to identity solutions, considering collective, rather                         
than purely individual, approaches to identity. A markedly more offline solution that has been proposed is                               
through ‘pseudonym parties’, which produce a temporary proof of personhood based on physical attendance,                           
forming a ‘seed set’ comprised of said attendees (​Howitt, 2019​). These seeds can validate other identities,                               
creating trusted clusters, which can fan out and validate larger and larger sets and communities.  
 
Other possible directions of future inquiry include explorations of anticollusion systems (​Buterin, 2019​), as well                             
as blind research into social networks - expanding the possibilities of establishing trust between nodes while                               
maintaining their privacy (​Whitehat, Gurkan, 2019​). It must also be noted that democratic governance is                             
possible even with bounded sybil penetration, meaning that a small amount of error within a system can be                                   
forgiven, which opens up possibilities for more intersectional and subjective approaches (​Shahaf et al., 2019​).   
 
Any endeavor to create functioning digital democracies can be undermined by exploitation of identity, from the                               
automated creation of false identities to corruption by third parties controlling a voter registry. Determining                             
who has the right to participate cannot be an afterthought of democracy: it is its elemental task. Further, the                                     
steady advancement of machine learning and artificial intelligence makes this problem particularly urgent.                         
Trustworthy and high-quality information is the foundation of a functioning democracy - and yet, from deep                               
fakes to language model outputs, machine-generated information is becoming easier to generate and spread. In                             
the future, there may be a need for cryptographic signatures on selected media or information pieces, to                                 
establish trust and authenticity (​Ford, 2020)​.  
 
Thus, in many senses, governance, democracy, and identity are strictly correlated. Structuring communication                         
architectures anchored on decentralized, privacy preserving, self sovereign and Sybil-resistant identity protocols                       
that can reach all humans with an Internet connection can open the path for new, radically participative                                 
peer-to-peer political movements and economies. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Identity is one of our most fundamental human attributes. However, in the age of surveillance capitalism,                               
identity itself has become a part of a new, digital political frontier (​Democracy Earth, 2017​; ​Zuboff, 2019​). As                                   
Edward Snowden, one of the most prominent activists for the end of surveillance practices in the world,                                 
recently warned during a videoconference at the 2019 Web3 Summit in Berlin: ​“The one vulnerability being                               
exploited across all systems is Identity.”  
 
If the “State is the monopoly on violence” as Max Weber once defined it, then the Surveillance State (or                                     
Surveillance Capital) is the monopoly on identity. Consolidated credential mechanisms today all verify humans                           
by implementing practices that require the disclosure of personal and private information to an identifier.                             
Eventually, this wealth of information accrues into credential monopolies, which are a prominent force in the                               
perilous drift toward democratic deconsolidation now threatening Western democracies. While there is                       
significant space for action in advancing effective public policies that contemplate those threats, approving and                             
enforcing them is often extremely challenging in the face of the powerful market forces they stand against. 
 
Surveillance capitalism bears a worldview that downgrades human value and dignity in favor of machine                             
learning systems. Proof of Personhood systems counter that logic by creating the building blocks of a                               
human-centered economy, where individuals directly control and have governance rights over the networks,                         
communities, and organizations they belong to. These systems invert the current logic of capitalism, creating                             
the base for solidarity economies that can safeguard and elevate the role of human consciousness, choice, and                                 
agency.  
 
Yes, the approaches explored in this review fall short of this goal in several ways, some still relying on existing                                       
sources of centralized information, others on small networks or high-cost synchronous tasks. Nonetheless,                         
Proof of Personhood projects present one of the few viable alternatives capable of addressing these problems at                                 
their root. In doing so, they illustrate that the best technologies do not abstract away subjectivity. Instead, they                                   
embrace it, seeing subjectivity for what it is: not just a necessity, but a strength.  
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